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Introduction
Two stories wax and wane in New Zealand debates about 
migration. With record arrivals, falling departures and high 
net migration (Figure 1), current public concerns are around 
pressures on housing, infrastructure and publicly funded 
services like schools and health care. In 1979 people fretted 
about whether the last one to leave would be turning out the 
lights.
tourism and foreign direct investment. 
Working-age migrants bring significant 
short-term fiscal advantages, although 
longer-term impacts are negligible. 
Immigration policy is also connected 
to population policy, and in New Zealand 
this is evident in discussion around 
migration replacing departing New 
Zealanders. As Figure 2 shows, non-citizen 
inflows have more than compensated for 
citizen departures since 1992. 
Figure 2 also shows that the number of 
departures and arrivals by New Zealand 
citizens is a key driver of net migration in 
New Zealand. While the government can 
control the number of non-citizens who 
arrive in New Zealand, it has no control 
over the numbers of people leaving or the 
number of citizens (and residents with 
return rights) returning from overseas. 
These numbers are both material and 
volatile, and this makes planning difficult.2
Arguments for increasing the 
population highlight the potential benefits 
of scale and agglomeration: the idea that a 
larger population, especially in Auckland, 
our largest city, is a necessary, if not 
sufficient, condition for improving the 
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Why have immigration?
Immigration is normally seen to be part 
of labour market policy and as a solution 
to problems of a shortage of labour or 
specific skills (an inability to find skilled 
employees is a consistent theme in the 
New Zealand Institute of Economic 
Research’s Quarterly Survey of Business 
Opinion). Where there is insufficient 
domestic labour willing to relocate 
to address localised skills shortages, 
as occurred in Christchurch after the 
2010–11 earthquakes, immigration can 
also reduce the need for economy-wide 
tightening of monetary policy to reduce 
wage pressures.
Immigrants boost international 
connections and can increase trade, 
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living standards of all New Zealanders. 
This narrative is based on several themes:
•	 There	are	‘agglomeration’	effects	from	
cities that can be (only) captured in a 
larger Auckland.
•	 Related	to	this,	high-paying	jobs	are	
created in the CBDs of big cities, and 
the bigger the city, the more high-
paying	jobs.
•	 Auckland	must	be	larger	to	‘compete’	
with other regional cities, with Sydney 
and Singapore cited as examples. This 
competition includes attracting 
migrants, who are themselves a source 
of economic prosperity – so we have 
an	‘Auckland	has	to	grow	so	it	can	
grow even more’ element here.
More generally, more population is seen 
as helping firms counteract the disadvan-
tages of New Zealand being small and 
distant from world markets; encouraging 
firm growth and innovation though 
increasing competitive pressure; and 
reducing the per capita cost of infrastructure 
with high fixed costs. However, increased 
scale is neither necessary nor sufficient to 
improve per capita well-being: there are 
small prosperous nations and large 
unproductive ones.
The economic effects of current policy
There is an extensive literature on the 
effects of migration on both migrants and 
the people and economy of the receiving 
country.3 This literature mainly uses 
economic output (gross domestic product, 
or GDP) and components of GDP as the 
benchmarks against which migration 
should	be	 judged.	 It	 concludes	 that	when	
measured on a per capita basis, migration 
has a small positive effect on modern, 
developed host countries like New Zealand.
Immigration comes with costs, too. 
Migrants need somewhere to live and 
work, and at a macroeconomic level these 
demand effects can initially outweigh 
supply effects and lead to shortages, 
congestion and price rises. 
Because immigrants increase both 
demand and supply in the economy, their 
net impact on the wages and employment 
of others is modest. Immigrants increase 
the likelihood of employers finding suitable 
workers. Highly skilled migrants are more 
likely to have complementary skills that 
can make firms more productive, including 
through	‘spillovers’,	although	whether	this	
happens in practice depends on whether 
their skills can be used effectively in local 
industries. Less-skilled migrants are more 
likely to substitute for local workers. 
An alternative framework: migration and 
well-being
GDP measures, in a single number with 
no double counting, the value of all the 
production in an economy in a single year. 
Its great utility is that it is comprehensive 
and comparable, both through time and 
between countries. Its drawbacks as a 
measure of welfare are well documented.4 
Some of the more important are that 
it ignores the distribution of income; 
it only captures flows, not changes in 
stocks of physical capital; it does not 
capture the effects of production on the 
environment (other than measuring the 
costs of remediation); it does not measure 
consumer surplus; it only covers goods 
and services traded in markets; and all 
consumption is given equal weight. GDP 
says nothing directly about social cohesion 
or the value of norms and institutions.
Despite considerable effort, no single 
number approach has been developed to 
replace GDP.5 There are, however, several 
multidimensional concepts of welfare that 
can be applied to test policies.6 Measures 
have been developed which provide a 
richer definition of welfare, but at 
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Figure 2: Net migration of New Zealand citizens and citizens of other countries 
Source: Statistics New Zealand
 
-60 
-40 
-20 
0 
20 
40 
60 
80 
000 
1950 1955 1960 1966 1971 1977 1982 1988 1993 1999 2004 2010 2015 
New Zealand Citizen 
Non-New Zealand Citizen 
Net Migration
Page 24 – Policy Quarterly – Volume 13, Issue 3 – August 2017
considerable cost to tractability. Value 
judgements	 are	 inevitable	 to	 weight	 the	
dimensions and adding-up problems 
must be solved.7
We consider that a better way to assess 
migration is to examine well-being 
impacts. This does not make policymaking 
easier, but it includes more things that 
matter and makes trade-offs more 
transparent.
Amartya Sen defines well-being as the 
capability to lead the kind of life a person 
values and has reason to value.8 Welfare 
increases when the set of capabilities each 
individual possesses increases (Stewart, 
2013). Using the framework underlying 
the OECD’s Better Life Index (see OECD, 
2011a, 1011b), we have developed a 
tentative list of the features of well-being 
that are relevant to migration policy in 
New Zealand today: see Table 1.
This framework is directed at 
improving the well-being of New 
Zealanders. This does not imply that we 
should	 adopt	 a	 ‘beggar-thy-neighbour’	
approach, especially in relation to 
developing countries, which are the source 
of many migrants, both skilled and 
unskilled.9
What to do
Migration is here to stay. The world is 
increasingly interconnected, through 
trade, travel and the internet. New Zealand 
is a multicultural nation.
While we have international commit-
ments that need to be honoured, including 
to refugees, the trans-Tasman travel 
arrangement, and reciprocal visa 
agreements and our special relationships 
with New Zealand territories and other 
Pacific states, as an independent country 
we have the freedom to decide what sort 
of society we want to be and what role 
migration policies should play in 
achieving our goals.
We now examine each of the 
dimensions of well-being relevant to 
migration in turn.
Housing and the environment
We know that, in addition to strong 
internal migration to the upper North 
Island, many migrants will want to 
settle in Auckland. If Auckland cannot 
or chooses not to provide sufficient new 
housing (and associated infrastructure) 
to accommodate people to the standard 
that we consider acceptable (in terms 
of quality and price and environmental 
footprint), then migration should be 
reduced, since preventing migrants (or 
indeed anyone else) living in Auckland is 
likely to be impossible.
Income
We should aim to attract migrants who 
have higher than average potential 
productivity and who will increase other 
dimensions of well-being if they settle 
here. Predicting who will be successful 
in increasing well-being is hard, because 
success is multidimensional. Being 
both more selective and willing to take 
calculated risks will require a nuanced, 
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Table 1 Aspects of well-being related to migration
Dimension Migration policy objectives
Housing The economy should have the capacity to house all migrants and 
existing residents to a standard that is acceptable.
Income We should aim to select migrants who have higher than average 
productivity because they are likely to increase the overall incomes 
of New Zealanders.
Jobs We should avoid bringing in large numbers of migrants with average 
skills or skills that are in reasonable supply locally, since they 
may have adverse effects for locals in the short- to medium-term 
(increased labour market insecurity and unemployment, decreased 
wages and employment). 
Community We should consider the quality of the support network that New 
Zealand can provide, since migrants, like everyone else, need social 
capital to thrive. 
Education We should manage migration flows so that we do not mask policy 
failures in the education system. Our goal should be to admit people 
who do not have skills that could be supplied by properly educated 
and trained locals.
Environment We should aim to bring in migrants who will maintain or increase 
environmental quality. More research is needed to determine which 
factors are most important in New Zealand.
Civic engagement We should explore whether there are interventions (such as access 
to settlement support) that will help migrants more quickly become 
engaged citizens.
Health We should seek migrants who can supply skilled medical labour 
that cannot be supplied locally at reasonable costs.
We should seek migrants (both individuals and in aggregate 
numbers) that the local health system can treat cost-effectively.
Life satisfaction We should target migrants who increase the life satisfaction of 
locals, balancing the benefits migrants bring from skills, and the 
wider range of experiences greater diversity can provide, against 
concerns about safety, access to housing and any negative effects on 
the labour market.
Safety We should target skilled migrants, who are likely to have a positive 
impact on public safety. We should minimise the numbers of 
unskilled migrants we bring in, and where feasible, ensure that 
migrants are supported. 
Work-life balance More research is needed to determine the impact of different groups 
of migrants on work-life balance in New Zealand. 
Treaty of Waitangi When setting migration policy, we should be mindful of the Crown’s 
obligations under the Treaty of Waitangi.
Source: Wilson and Fry, 2017
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discriminating set of criteria and an 
acceptance that not every migrant will 
make a positive contribution.
Jobs
Migration can be an effective way of 
‘greasing	the	wheels’	of	economic	growth,	
by increasing the short-term supply of 
people with required skills. But in the long 
term we want to ensure that everyone in 
New Zealand has the freedom to live the 
life they value and to be able to make 
choices that translate their potential to be 
or do a variety of things into actual beings 
or doings.
In some areas, like health, where there are 
worldwide shortages of skilled professionals 
that New Zealand alone can neither correct 
nor be isolated from, migrants will continue 
to make a valuable contribution to providing 
the public services that New Zealanders 
value. But migration should not be a long-
term substitute for the development of New 
Zealanders.
Community and civic engagement; life 
satisfaction and safety
Migrants, like everyone else, need social 
capital to thrive. We want migrants to lead 
a good life and enhance the lives of the 
communities	they	join.
Apart from a limited number of 
refugees and asylum seekers, we expect 
migrants to either bring social capital 
with them (which often means coming 
from countries similar to New Zealand) 
or build it themselves once they arrive, 
often with the help of earlier migrants. We 
worry that if migrants do not behave 
according to the norms and institutions of 
New Zealand, the life satisfaction and 
feelings of safety of the country will suffer, 
yet we do little to promote those 
behaviours.
We should consider how to help 
migrants to develop the social capital they 
need to contribute to increases in well-
being across all its dimensions. At the 
same time, we need to avoid 
monoculturalism, since inward-looking, 
isolated societies are less likely to flourish.
Treaty of Waitangi
Migration is an area where the Crown 
continues to act as if the Treaty of 
Waitangi gives it carte blanche. Ranginui 
Walker, however, saw the Treaty as a 
contract between the British Crown and 
iwi which granted permission to bring in 
British	subjects,	but	did	not	envisage	the	
multicultural society that has resulted 
from policies directed at skill and labour 
shortages rather than based on country 
preference (Walker, 1993).
The liberal values that have led many 
Päkehä to see that the Treaty should be 
honoured are the same set of values that 
also	saw	the	‘white	New	Zealand	policy’	as	
no longer appropriate. Expecting the 
Crown to be liberal when it comes to 
Mäori but having a different approach to 
foreigners might be asking too much. 
Reconciling the Crown’s current 
migration policy with Treaty is an issue 
yet to be addressed.
Policy changes
Applying the well-being framework 
suggests three changes to policy:
•	 reducing	flows	of	less-skilled	
migrants;
•	 increasing	the	calibre	of	skilled	
migrants; and
•	 targeting	transformational	migrants.
We need to consider both temporary 
and permanent flows. In the year to June 
2016, 192,688 work visas were approved, 
compared with 52,052 residence visas (see 
Figure 3) (Ministry of Business, 
Innovation and Employment, 2016, pp.40, 
iii). Almost 5% of the New Zealand labour 
force hold a temporary work visa (Fry and 
Glass, 2016, p.58). 
New Zealand does not have a shortage 
of unskilled labour: uncontrolled flows of 
Figure 3: New worker visa approvals by entry category
Source: Ministry of Business, Innovation and Employment
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working holidaymakers and students with 
work rights are the result of foreign policy 
and	 export	 education	 objectives	 being	
prioritised over the well-being of locals. 
Reducing inflows of unskilled and low-
skilled temporary migrants should be a 
priority. The skill level of both temporary 
and	permanent	‘skilled	migrants’	has	been	
declining over time. As Figure 4 shows, 
successful applicants for New Zealand 
residence under the Study to Work 
category increasingly hold lower-level 
diplomas. These are lower levels of skills 
than were anticipated when the policy was 
designed.
It does not make sense to provide 
permanent residence to people working in 
low-earning	 retail	 management	 jobs	 or	
those in the tourist and hospitality 
industries. If there are areas of labour 
shortage, they are more appropriately 
dealt with through temporary visas, and 
through training New Zealanders. 
Migrants who have the potential to 
enhance the well-being of New Zealanders 
across more than one of the dimensions 
of well-being should be a priority, 
although our ability to identify such 
people is low: at present we have difficulty 
selecting migrants who have the potential 
to contribute to GDP per capita. 
Targeting people likely to make a 
bigger difference can involve greater risk, 
but there are ways to manage this. The 
Edmund Hillary Fellowship is currently 
recruiting the first cohort of 100 fellows 
who will be eligible to enter New Zealand 
on a three-year global impact visa. Rather 
than emphasising traditional screening 
measures such as age, previous experience 
and detailed business plans, fellows – who 
can include whole start-up teams – are 
being assessed based on recommendations 
from pro-social networks, their potential 
to develop ventures in New Zealand that 
could create global impact, and the extent 
to which their proposed ventures are 
consistent with New Zealand’s values and 
needs.
There would also be value in making 
the immigration process easier for small 
numbers of very highly skilled people. 
Although New Zealand may never be the 
first choice for the world’s most driven 
people, greater efficiency and certainty 
would make us more attractive to top 
talent looking for alternatives as other 
countries tighten their border controls. 
Conclusion
Migration has been good for New 
Zealand, but it has not been great. We 
think using a well-being framework has 
the potential to make it better. Focusing 
on smaller numbers of more highly 
skilled immigrants, and considering 
important broader issues that a simple 
focus on per capita GDP allows us to 
ignore, should lead to more effective and 
more sustainable immigration policy for 
New Zealand.
1 Full disclosure: both authors are migrants. This article draws 
on work sponsored by the New Zealand Institute of Economic 
Research’s public good fund (Wilson and Fry, 2017), for 
which support we are grateful. We also thank Jonathan 
Boston for helpful comments on the draft. Any remaining 
errors are our responsibility.
2 Relative to our population, New Zealand has a large 
diaspora, with estimates of numbers living offshore ranging 
from 600,000 to more than a million (Fry and Glass, 2016, 
p.33).
3 Fry and Glass (2016) provide an accessible recent summary.
4 See Stiglitz, Sen and Fitoussi (2009) and the papers 
published at: https://www.insee.fr/en/information/2662494.
5 For a survey, see Fleurbaey and Blanchet (2013).
6 Some of the better known are the United Nations 
Development Programme’s Human Development Index and 
the OECD’s Better Life Index.
7 In measured GDP, all production is converted to dollars using 
market prices and then summed. Multidimensional measures 
are often based on scales, like 10 to 1, meaning that the 
units of measure have no particular meaning.
8 For a good summary of the capabilities approach, see Dalziel 
and Saunders (2014).
9 The health sector is an example. The efficient operation 
of our public health system relies on migrant health 
professionals. At the same time, there is a worldwide 
shortage of such professionals, especially in developing 
countries. We need to have regard to the effects of our 
migration policies on such countries.
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